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The Factors' Lien Act as a
Method of Inventory Financing
Richard C. Ogline
FOR GENERATIONS businessmen in the United States and other com-
mercial countries have been searching for a feasible method of obtaining
loans on the security of raw material, goods in process and finished product.
The need for such financing arises generally in the case of a small manu-
facturer or processor of goods who has already encumbered his real estate
and fixtures in order to purchase raw material and requires additional fi-
nancing with which to meet salaries, utility costs or other operating ex-
penses. His inventory is
his only remaining asset of
THE AUTHoR (A.B., 1948, Mount Union Col- immediate security value.
lege; LL.B., 1951, Western Reserve Umver- The problem is obw-
sity) is Law Clerk to the Honorable Emerich B.
Freed, Judge of the Federal District Court for ous. Our borrower must
the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, find some way to utilize his
and formerly served as a member of the staff inventory (raw maerial)
of the Office of Counsel of the Cleveland Trust
Company. as security so as to obtain
the desired operating capi-
tal; however, the pledging
of his inventory would have the effect of terminating his enterprise because
the efficacy of the common law pledge as a security device depends upon
possession by the lender of the object pledged.' If the lender fails, in the
first instance, to obtain possession or if he later suffers the loss of possession,
he loses the security for his loan.
At an early date the borrower and his banker attempted to solve the
problem by the execution of a chattel mortgage containing an after-acquired
property clause to compensate for the shifting of merchandise. The attempt
failed, however, because of judicial invalidation of the after-acquired prop-
erty clause 5
'Thorne v. First National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 254 (1881); Deardorff v. Fullington,
Dayton 96 (Montgomery Super. Ct. 1868).
'In Ohio a chattel mortgage containing an after-acquired property clause gives the
mortgagee no right in property acquired by the mortgagor after the execution of the
mortgage. Chapman v. Weaner, 4 Ohio St. 481 (1855). The ineffectiveness of
the after-acquired property clause persists even though a liberal rule of description
of mortgaged chattels prevails in Ohio. The reason for the failure of the after-
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The possibility that trust receipt financing might provide the needed
capital for the manufacturer and, at the same time, afford adequate protec-
tion to the lender could not be realized because the trust receipt was designed
to furnish inventory to the borrower3 and, therefore, is utterly useless to a
manufacturer who has already acquired an inventory, but who desperately
needs operating capital.
From a cursory examination a field warehousing plan would appear to
meet the needs of 'the parties. Field warehousing has proved successful in
the case of grocers and other dealers in staple commodities which are
handled in their original form, but it entails too many restrictions on the
borrower's freedom of control of inventory to be of value to a manufacturer.
Thus there was needed a hybrid form of security device which eliminated
the shortcomings, but retained the beneficial aspects, of the above types of
financing. It is not unusual that such a hybrid plan should be provided by
legislation. It is somewhat surprising, however, that the ultimate solution
to the problem of the manufacturer and his financial agent should be dis-
covered in a specie of commercial financing which antedates the problem
itself.
HIsTORicAL DEVELOPMENT OF FACTORING
There is evidence that the commercial factor was known to the ancient
Romans, at least to a limited extent. He attained his maturity, however,
during the early colomal period of the British Empire. British merchants,
desirous of taking advantage of the growing markets in the Americas, found
it unsatisfactory, and sometimes impossible, to make direct contact with
customers in the colonies; and, as a result; factoring came into prominence.
The normal procedure called for the British businessman to select a
dependable agent in the colomes or send one of his own choosing to take up
residence there. The British merchant would then entrust his goods to the
acquired property clause in the situation under consideration is the continuous
change in the character of the chattels as well as the fact that entirely new chattels
are subsequently acquired. 7 OHIO JUI. 296.
'In re Chappel, 77 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ore 1948); Hanna, Trust Receipts, 19 CALIF.
L. REy. 257 (1931). In a trust receipts operation, the lender takes ride to the
merchandise and entrusts it to the borrower who uses it in his business, the lender
being required under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act only to file a certificate of
intention to enter into such financing. UNIFORM TRUST REIEIPTS Acr § 13, 9
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 372.
'In a field warehousing arrangement the borrower is required to segregate the goods
which are subject to the lien, to post a sign indicating the lien at the location of the
goods and to employ a warehouseman to supervise the passage of inventory in and
out of the warehouse. The borrower is required further to obtain a release of some
nature, depending upon the type of plan used, from the lender for inventory re-
moved and sold in the regular course of the business. He is also required periodi-
cally to furnish the lender with warehouse receipts covering new inventory received.
See Note, 37 VA. L Rv. 1023 (1951).
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factor in the colonies; the factor would proceed to select his own customers,
make the sales, retain an agreed commission and forward the balance to his
principal in the mother country. The legal effect of the- transaction was
similar to a pledge. Tide remained in the principal until the goods were
sold, but the factor acquired possession and a lien on the goods to assure the
payment of his commission.
In tune the factor began to find it to his advantage to sell the goods on
credit. Consequently the structure of his arrangement with his principal
underwent some revision.' In some instances he would purchase the goods
himself and sell them on his own account and on his own terms. More
commonly; however, either he would advance funds to his principal on the
basis of the goods received or he would guarantee the credit of his cus-
tomers. In the latter two instances, of course, the factor retained his lien for
commissions.
It might, from a mere perusal of historical development, be difficult to
perceive just how the early merchant-factoring arrangement could furnish
the solution to the present day problem of inventory financing for manu-
facturers. Actually, however, an analysis of the factoring concept reveals
that only the requirement of possession of the entrusted goods by the factor
would render it unworkable as a method of inventory financing.
The first step toward removal of the requirement of possession by the
lender came with the 1911 amendment to Section 45 of the New York
Personal Property Law. Prior to the amendment that section was little more
than a legislative expression of the common law rules of factoring, in that
it provided for a pledge of goods by the principal to the factor and for a
lien in favor of the factor, but founded upon his possession of the pledged
goods. However, after the amendment of 1911 and the subsequent, though
less revolutionary, amendments of 1931, 1935 and 1943, Section 45 read,
in part, as follows:
If so provided by any written agreement with their principals, con-
signers or employers (hereinafter called the person creating the lien), all
factors, consignees and commission merchants shall have a continuing
general lien upon all goods and merchandise from time to time consigned
to or pledged with them, whether in their constructive, actual or exclusive
occupancy or possession or not for all their loans and advances to or for
the account of the person creating the lien and such lien shall be valid
from the time of the agreement creating the lien or at the time of filing
such nonce or shall come into existence subsequently thereto or shall subse-
quently thereto be acquired by the person creating the lien.
Thus the first time there came into existence a workable plan whereby a
'For a more detailed analysis of historical development of the factor see Cameron,
Factors' Lens in Ohto, 23 Ohio Bar 361 (1950); 2 MEcHAm, AGENcy §§ 2496-97
(2d ed. 1914).
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manufacturer or processor of goods could pledge his stock-in-trade as security
for a loan and, at the same time, retain possession of the pledged materials
for use in his business. 6
Unfortunately, the very persons whom the new law was calculated to
benefit were slow to recognize its potential. Nor did the new enactment
find ready approval in the other states. From 1911 until 1938, when sim-
lar statutory provisions were enacted in Rhode Island and South Carolina,
Section 45 of the New York Personal Property Law remained the only
legislative enactment of its type in the country. Nevertheless, despite criti-
cism ranging from mild skepticism to condemnation, 7 in recent years, the
legislatures of the more commercially minded states began to pass similar
legislation, and at the present time twenty-two state have enacted what has
come to be called a Factors' Lien Act."
These acts have created a new type of factor who differs from the an-
cestor, whose name he bears, in that his primary function is the lending of
money on the security of inventory, as opposed to the selling of entrusted
goods for a commission. This new factor was created by the simple ex-
pedient of eliminating as a prerequisite for the pledge and resultant lien of
the factor the necessity of his taking and maintaining possession of the
pledged property.
FACTORS' LIN ACTS TODAY
The Factors' Lien Acts in all states follow the general pattern of the
original New York amendment of 1917, although they differ to a con-
siderable degree in their specific provisions. Each act, with the exception of
that of Connecticut, provides for a master-factoring agreement owned or
'It is recognized that the New York Act, as it is now constituted, also governs the
original form of factoring whereby the factor takes possession of the goods as a
selling agent, but that form of transaction is beyond the scope of this article.
'The acts have been challenged for poor draftsmanship. Gilmore, Chattel Securtty:
U, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 768 (1948). They have been further ctiticized as requrng
too much supervision on the part of the lender. Steffan and Danziger, The Rebrth
of the Commerct4 Factor, 36 COL. L REV. 745 (1936).
SALA. CODE ANN. t.t 47, § 132 (1), et. seq. (1947); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT.
H8 7256 et seq. (1949); DEL. Rnv. CODE c. 79, § 3340A et seq. (1935); ME.
REV. STAT. c. 167, § 3-A et seq. (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN LAws art 2, §
21, et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1947); MAsS. ANN. LAws c. 255, §§ 40 et seq. (1945);
MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 26A15(1) et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1951); MiNN. STAT. c .514,
§ 514.80 (Henderson 1949); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. H8 430.260 et seq. (1949);
N.H. REV. LAWS c 262-A, § 1 et. seq. (1943); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:60-252 et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1951); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 45; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. H8 44-
70 et seq. (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. ut. 6, H8 221 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1952);
OmIo GEN. CODE H8 8364-1 et seq., R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 447, § 1 et seq. (1938);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8785-1 et seq. (Supp. 1946); TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. art
5506c, § 1 etseq. (1948); VT. CODE c. 129, H8 2738 et seq. (1947); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-144 (1950); W Va. CODE ANN. H8 3946 (17) et seq. (1949); Wis.
STAT. § 241.145 et seq. (1951).
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in the possession of the borrower In all of the acts there is a requirement
that inventory received by the borrower subsequent to the execution of the
master agreement shall be designated in separate written statements de-
livered to the factor.'0 Each state requires that a written notice of the
factor's lien be recorded; however, provisions of the various statutes differ
greatly as to the information to be included in the notice and the place in
which it shall be recorded."
All of the acts stipulate that the factor's lien shall be valid from the time
of the recording of notice thereof as against the claims of unsecured creditors
of the borrower and against other liens subsequently perfected, 2 except that
liens acquired by third persons as a result of "processing, warehousing, ship-
ping or otherwise dealing with the merchandise"' 3 shall be superior liens.
It is also contemplated under all of the statutes that the borrower, so long as
he abides by the provisions of the act and the terms of his master-agreement,
shall have the right to deal with the pledged merchandise as though the
same were free from the lien and to sell the finished product in the regular
course of his business to purchasers who take free of the lien.'
Despite the similarity in structure of the Factors' Lien Acts there are
numerous variations as to specific details.
In two states' 5 the act is limited in its application to a manufacturer or
processor of merchandise, in another,'" to wholesalers, as opposed to bor-
rowers who display their products for sale on the retail market. Less than
one-half of the acts expressly exclude from the operation of the lien trade
fixtures, which of course, were never intended to come within the acts'
coverage.' 7
*Section 8364-2 of the Ohio General Code begins: "If so provided by any written
agreement with the borrower, a factor shall have a lien upon such merchandise
owned by and in the custody or possession of the borrower, including such mer-
chandise as is temporarily out of the borrower's custody or possession.10E .g., OHio GEN. CODE § 8364-2 (Cum. Supp. 1952)
The Ohio Act requires that notice of lien be filed in the office of the county re-
corder of the county wherein the borrower does business or has its principal place
of business or principal office (corporation) or, if the borrower does no business
in Ohio or has no principal place of business or office in Ohio (corporation), in the
county where the merchandise is located. OHio GEN. CODE § 8364-2, 8364-3.
E.g., OHIO GEN. CODE § 8364-4.
1lbid.
14Ibid.
E'B.g., MICK. STAT. ANN. § 26.415(1) (Cum. Supp. 1951). Vermont has a simi-
lar provision.
"TEX. STAT., REv. Civ. art. 5506c, § 1 (1948)
i" Ohio excludes from the act's coverage not only trade fixtures but also "machinery,"
"equipment" and "motor vehicle, whether or not intended for sale." OHio GEt.
CODE § 8364-1. In re Wyse Laboratories, Inc., 55 Ohio L. Abs. 321 (S.D. Ohio
1949). There seems no sound reason why the benefits of this method of financing
[Slimmer
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In most of the states which have enacted this legislation a sign must be
posted wherever goods subject to a factor's lien are stored in order to notify
those who deal with the borrower that his stock-in-trade is covered by the
lien.'8 It is submitted that the requirement of the posting of a sign di-
mimshes the attractiveness of factors' lien financing from the standpoint of
both the borrower and his banker. In the first place, it is quite possible the
sign will create the effect of a psychological sales detriment to the borrower
for a new, and perhaps somewhat timid, customer may have some misgivings
over dealing with a firm that finances its operations by a pledge of its mer-
chandise. Secondly, to require the lender to ascertain that a sign remains
posted during the existence of the lien merely imposes upon the lender one
more obligation in an arrangement which has already been criticized for the
amount of policing which it entails. Admittedly, the presence of a sign
furnishes an immediate and concrete warning to all those who deal with the
borrower, but there is nothing unreasonably burdensome in requiring third
persons to rely on the record notice, as has been done in the case of deeds,
leases and mortgages.
The place of recording the lien differs greatly under the various acts.
The recording points commonly stipulated are governed by (1) the loca-
non of the goods, (2) the location of the borrower's place of business and
(3) the location of the factor's place of business. In some states notice of
lien need be recorded only in the county or mumcipality (depending upon
the recording system of the particular state) where the merchandise is
situated;29 in others, however, it is required to be filed in various com-
bmations of two of the above locations.2 0
In only six states2' is there to be found any limitation of nime within
which a notice of lien must be filed. In those states it is stipulated that
should be foreclosed from manufacturers of motor vehicles, but as the Act now reads
such is the result.
' For example, in New York it is provided: " there shall be placed and main-
tained in a conspicuous place at the main entrance of the store, loft or other prem-
ises in or at which such merchandise, or any part thereof, shall be located, kept, or
stored, a sign on which is printed in legible English, the name of the lienor and a
designation of said lienor as lienor, factor or consignee. "N. Y. PERS. PROP.
LAW § 45. Ohio has no such requirement.
"E.g., DEL. REv. CODE c. 79, § 3340-A (1945).
:' In Maine the notice is required to be filed at both the borrower's and lender's lo-
canon. ME. REV. STAT. c. 167, § 3-A (1944). In South Carolina it must be filed
at the location of the borrower and the location of the merchandise. S.C. CODa ANN.
§ 8785-3 (Supp. 1946). New Jersey requires the notice to be filed at the location
of the factor and the location of the merchandise. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:60-254
(Cum. Supp. 1951).
'Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio and West Virgima. Ohio
requires the notice to be filed within 15 days after the execution of the factoring
agreement. OmIo GBN. CoDa § 8364-3.
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such notice must be filed within a period, ranging from ten 22 to thirty
days, 23 after the execution of the factoring agreement. However, the
statutes fail to make clear the effect of a failure to file within the specified
period, nor have there been any judicial expressions on that subject In
Irvnig Trust Co. v. Lndrer & Brothers, Inc.24 the highest court of New
York held that the complete failure of a lender to file notice of lien had
the effect of nullifying the lien when the factor attempted to take actual
possession of his security within four months of the bankruptcy of the
borrower. Although the New York act contains no time limitation,
within which notice of the lien must be filed, it is suggested that the
courts are likely to deal quite severely with factors who fail to record notice
of their liens within the required period of tune.
These time period provisions for filing notice are susceptible of a
number of different interpretations. It is possible that the courts may re-
gard them as mere grace periods for the benefit of the lender, in which
case, if the lender records on the last day of the period, he would obtain
a lien prior to the rights of any creditor who received his security during
the time period. In conjunction with such an interpretation, it is likely
that a factor might be permitted to record his notice of lien anytime
after the running of the period, with the sole qualification that he lose
his priority of lien over creditors who obtain their security before record-
ing by the factor. Those seem the more logical rules of construction to
apply to the time statutes; nevertheless, it is not improbable that the time
requirements may be regarded as imposing an absolute obligation on the
factor, and his non-compliance will result in the loss of the lien.
In a great majority of the states which have enacted Factors' Lien Acts,
the lien remains valid for an indefinite period after the recording of nonce.
In a few states, however, statutes have been passed limiting the life of a
factor's lien.25
Another question over which the acts are at considerable variance is
the fate of the factor's lien on specified merchandise after that merchan-
dise has been sold in the regular course of the business of the borrower.
In most states the act expressly provides that the lien on the merchandise
shall cease at the time of the sale.26 A majority of the acts provide further
that the lien shall attach to the proceeds of the sale;27 and along this same
"MAss. ANN. LAws c. 255, § 42 (1945).
"W VA. CODE ANN. § 3946 (20) (1949)
-"264 N.Y. 165, 190 N.E. 332 (1934).
' In Ohio the notice of lien remains valid for 3 years after filing, but may be refiled
for an additional 3 year period upon the termination of the first 3 years. Query:
May the nouce be refiled more than once? OHIo GEN. CODE § 8364-5.
'4 E.g. Oi-ro GEN. CODE § 8364-4.
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line, a few acts have provided for an automatic transfer of the lien to the
resultant account receivable where the sale has been made on a credit
bas S.2 1 In a number of states the legislators, fearful either that the at-
tachment of the lien to the proceeds of a sale might infringe upon the
normal right of the borrower to accept the return of merchandise and make
other adjustments with his customers or that such adjustments or returns
might subject the factor to the loss of his lien, have enacted statutes pro-
viding for the maintenance of the lien intact as to the balance of the pur-
chase price or account receivable after adjustment between the borrower
and his customer.29
To the banker-factor, who wishes to insure the retention of hIs se-
curity, the importance of strict compliance with the terms of the act can
scarcely be overemphasized. There are numerous decisions in cases in-
volving bankrupt debtors which stand as mute testimony of the courts'
dislike for liens which do not afford third persons the highest degree of
opportunity to obtain notice thereof or with respect to which the lienors
have been somewhat less than diligent in securing their rights.30
Every banker who contemplates factors' lien financing must, of course,
give serious consideration to the possibility of the bankruptcy of his bor-
rower. Under Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act3 ' any preferential trans-
fer made by a bankrupt within four months prior to the filing of a peti-
tion in bankruptcy may be set aside by the trustee in bankruptcy. Under
the 1938 amendment to that section a transfer was deemed to have been
made "when it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from
the debtor and no creditor could have acquired any rights in the property
27.g., N.Y. Pints. PRop. LAw § 45. The Ohio Act contains no reference to the
subject
E.g., N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAw § 45.
'Section 2:60:257 of the New Jersey Act reads: "If merchandise sold, or any
part thereof, is returned to or recovered by the assignor from the person owing the
account receivable and is thereafter dealt with by him as his own property, or if the
assignor grants credits, allowances or adjustments to a person owing an account re-
ceivable, the right to or lien of the lienor or assignee upon any balance remaining
owing on such account receivable and his right to or lien on any other account receiv-
able assigned to him by the assignor shall not be invalidated, irrespective of whether
the assignee shall have consented to or acquiesced in, such acts of the assignor."
' Corn Exchange Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1942) (failure
to file notice of assignment of accounts receivable resulted in loss of lien when bor-
rower became bankrupt within four months); Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 45
Sup. Ct. 566 (1925) (assignment of accounts receivable held fraudulent where
assignor not required to account to borrower for proceeds of collected accounts);
Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601) (secret assignment
of goods by debtor held fraudulent where debtor retained possession of and freedom
of disposal over goods); cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Lindner & Bros., Inc., 264 N.Y. 165,
190 N.E. 332 (1934).
n64 STAT. 25, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1950).
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thereafter superior to the rights of the transferee." This so-called "bona
fide purchaser ftst" aroused the fears of the conscientious banker-factor.
Under the Factors' Lien Act certain persons were granted rights superior to
his lien, even though their rights may have come into existence after the
creation of the lien.3 2 The mere fact that these classes of persons had the
power under given circumstances to defeat the factor's lien by acquiring
rights in the property "superior to the rights of the transferee" rendered it
impossible for the factor ever to perfect his lien insofar as the Bankruptcy
Act was concerned. 3 The factor would, therefore, constantly run the
risk of losing his lien in the event of the bankruptcy of the borrower.
After twelve years, however, Congress came to his aid by amending
Section 60a so as to supply what has been called the "subsequent lien test."
Under this amendment in 1950 a transfer is deemed to have been made
at the time "when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee. '3 4 Thus, the
fact that a bona fide purchaser in the course of business could defeat the
.factor's lien no longer prevented its perfection. Congress further allayed
the fears of the factor by excluding from the definition of the word "lien",
as used in the amendment, all "liens which under applicable law are given
a special priority over other liens which are prior in tme."3'  This brings
the specific lienors covered in Ohio General Code Section 8364-4 squarely
within the exclusionary provision of the definition. Today, therefore,
although one who engages in the "processing' or "warehousing" of the
merchandise covered by the factor's lien has the power to obtain a lien
superior to that of the factor, this fact does not result in the destruction of
the factor's lien in the case of the bankruptcy of the borrower.
SuGGEsTED AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO Acr
The factors' lien acts in all states have been subjected to a great deal of
criticism, which was to some extent justifiable, for the low calibre of
draftsmanship which went into their preparation.36  In that respect, the
"" specific liens arising out of contractual acts of the borrower with reference
to the processing, warehousing, shipping, or otherwise dealing with the merchandise
in the usual course of the borrower's business, preparatory to their sale, shall be
superior to the lien of the factor on such merchandise. " Oio GEN. CODE §
8364-4. In addition, under the same section purchasers in the "course of business"
took the property free from the lien of the factor.
2'See 3 COLLIER, ON BANKRuPTCY § 60.38 (14th ed. 1941)
"64 STAT. 25, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (a) (1) (1950)
Tbtud.
"See note 7 supra.
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Ohio enactment is even less artistic than the average. Nevertheless, a few,
relatively simple changes would eradicate most of its existing deficiencies.
1. The term "borrower," as used in the Act, is not defined. It is
suggested that "borrower" be limited to the class of persons or corporations
qualifying as "manufacturers" or "processors" of goods or materials who do
not display their goods for retail sale to the general public. Such a change
would alleviate, to a certain extent, the dangers inherent in the muliplicity
of security devices which are available in types of business enterprises
other than manufacturing, and also would serve to eliminate some of the
necessity of policing on the part of the factor.
2. It is obvious to one who is familiar with the Factors' Lien Act of
another state that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Ohio General Code
Section 8364-2 are intended to set forth the requirements of the notice of
lien in Ohio. Yet, to a person whose first contact with factors' liens comes
with a reading of the Ohio Act, the purpose of those paragraphs is not so
readily apparent. Standing as they do, without a verb and completely
divorced by lack of reference from the remainder of the Section, they
serve only to confuse the reader who is earnestly attempting to discover
what he must do to comply with the Act. The purpose of subparagraphs
(a), (b) and (c) can be clarified merely by prefacing them with an in-
troductory sentence.3 7
3. As has been previously discussed, a great deal of the misgiving
which is aroused by any type of inventory or receivable financing stems
directly from the fear that third parties will not be furnished adequate no-
tice of the extent of the lender's lien. With that fact in mind, it would
seem advisable to amend Section 8364-2 so as to require the nonce of lien
to include a description of the merchandise subject to the lien in its vari-
ous stages of production 38 and the maximum amount of advances to be
made under the master agreement.39
4. Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the Ohio Act is its failure
to stipulate what happens to the lien upon the sale of the merchandise
within its coverage. The lien becomes detached from the goods; however,
it is not dear as to whether it follows the proceeds of the sale. The pro-
tection of the lender absolutely demands that a provision transferring the
'This has been done by the Bureau of Code Revision for the new Ohio Revised
Code. See Okno REv. CODE § 1311.61.
'Michigan has so required. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.415(4) (Cum. Supp. 1951)
Bankers making loans under the Act probably will find it helpful, in administering
their loans, to incorporate by a column arrangement in their master agreement, a
general description of the security as it passes through the various stages of produc-
non, from acquisition to sale.
' Missouri and West Virgima so require. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 430.260 (1949);
W VA. CODE ANN. § 3946(18) (1949).
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lien to the proceeds of a cash sale be inserted in the Act. But what of the
case where the borrower sells on credit terms? Is the lender to suffer the
loss of his lien in that situation? As the act now stands,40 the answer is
probably "yes." There is nothing to restrain the borrower from assigning
his accounts receivable to a third party. The obvious remedy for that
problem is the addition of a phrase providing for an automatic transfer of
the factor's lien to the account receivable resulting from the sale of specific
merchandise. But that raises another question. Are the parties, then,
required to comply with the Ohio statutes relating to the recording of assign-
ments of accounts receivable? 41 The answer again must be in the affirma-
tive, for third parties, negotiating for the assignment of the accounts, should
not be required to search the record in a more extensive manner than
would permit discovery of assignments taken and recorded in the usual
manner.
5. For reasons previously stated, it would seem advisable to amend the
Ohio Act so as to provide for the perpetuation of the factor's lien in the
case of a return of merchandise or other adjustment between the borrower
and his customers. The adjustment provision of the New Jersey Act is
suggested as a pattern.42
6. Under Section 8364-4 of the Ohio General Code a purchaser "in
the ordinary course of the business of the borrower" takes free and clear of
the factor's lien. But who is a purchaser in the ordinary course of the
business? Does a creditor of the borrower who accepts merchandise in
satisfaction of a pre-existing debt meet the qualifications? Probably not.
Nevertheless, the question should not be left open to conjecture. Minnesota
and Wisconsin have attempted to provide the solution by requiring that
the purchaser give "value.' 43 Still there remains the question of whether
(or not the cancellation of a pre-existing debt is to be considered value.44
The problem is best solved by requiring the purchaser to give "new value,"
as under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.45
CONCLUSION
Despite the skepticism of many bankers, it may still be said, with com-
plete conviction, that the Factors' Lien Act satisfies a vital need in our
40 OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 8509-3 et seq.
4 iOHio GEN. CODE §§ 8509-3 et seq.
'
2 See note 29 supra.
"MINN. STAT. c. 514, § 514.83 (Henderson 1949); Wis. STAT. § 241.145 (1951).
"There is some indication in Ohio law that cancellation of a so-called antecedent
debt constitutes consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. Fowler v.
Smith, 24 Ohio App. 324, 156 N.E. 913 (1926)
'"UNiFoRm TRusT REcEiprs ACT § 1; 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 372.
[Slimmer
1953] FACTORS' LIEN ACT
private financial system. Admttedly, it has its faults, the gteatest of which
is its complicated procedure, but the benefits to the borrower, and to small-
scale enterprises generally, far outweigh its limitations. It is a matter of
near certainty that an increasing number of bankers and manufacturers alike
will begin to show an interest in factoring as time proves its worth.
Undoubtedly, the previously suggested amendments of the Ohio Act
would serve to eliminate a great many of the technical problems of compli-
ance with the terms of the Act. Nevertheless, it would be sheer folly to
state that the mere incorporation of those amendments would relieve the
banker-factor of all risks attendant upon the making of loans on the security
of goods in process. There is a certain element of chance which the banker
must accept in making any type of loan, and in many wstance , he must
also accept the accompanying possibility of the loss of his security, whether
or not he has taken possession thereof. The risks which remain are prop-
erly to be considered the responsibility of the banker. As in any other
type of loan, the banker-factor may minmize those risks by conscientious
analysis of the borrower's market, financial standing and business practices,
and by alert supervision of his loan.
